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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

CHARLES STEVEN ARCHULETTA,

Case No. 15919

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, CHARLES STEVEN ARCHULETTA, appeals from
a conviction of Forcible Sodomy in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant,

CHA..~ES

STEVEN ARCHULETTA, was charged

with Rape, a Felony of the Second Degree, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-402 (1953 as amended) and Forcible Sodomy, a
Felony of the Second Degree in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-403 (1953 as amended).

At jury trial appellant was acquitted

of the charge of Rape, but found guilty of the charge of Forcible
Sodomy.

Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the

indeterminate term of one to fifteen years for that conviction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third Judicial
District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The State alleged that Michelle Christiansen was raped
by appellant on September 27, 1977, and that shortly thereafter
was forced to engage in sodomy with him at an apartment somewhere
on the east side of Salt Lake City.

Seventeen year-old Michelle

Christiansen testified at trial that at approximately 5:30 or
6:00 p.m. on the evening of the 26th of September, 1977, while
riding with three of her female friends in the area of 600 South
and 900 East in Salt Lake City, she, along with the others, engaged in a conversation with appellant while he was driving
another car going the same direction.

She testified that the

appellant asked herself and her friends if they all wanted to go
to a party, and they agreed.

Appellant drove his truck to the

location of the party and rode with the girls to one Diana Visick's
house to change into other clothing.

Michelle and Lisa Don

Thornwall drove appellant back towards the party in Diana's
car.

Along the way they stopped at a grocery store to buy beer.

Michelle testified that at the party she, along with the others,
drank beer and that there was marijuana being smoked.
A while later Lisa Don, the appellant, and Michelle
agreed to leave the party and drove to Gerrard Avenue, a location
one block behind the State Capitol Building, where the three of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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them sat in the car for a considerable period of time, talking
and drinking beer (T. 19,38).

Some time after the three indi-

viduals had been parked at Gerrard Avenue, all three individuals
took a pill or capsule.

Michelle also testified that she had

consumed two to two and a half beers, maybe (T. 39).

The three

sat for a while longer talking.

During this time appellant kissed

Lisa (T. 20) and also Michelle.

They then decided to leave

Gerrard Avenue.

Lisa Don decided that she wanted to go home (T.20).

She dropped Michelle and appellant off at the appellant's mother's
place.

Appellant indicated he would be meeting with his sister to

get a car and that he could take Michelle home after they had gone
out to eat breakfast (T. 21).
After a few minutes when the car had not arrived, Michelle
asked to use the lavatory and the appellant walked with her around
the corner to another apartment.

He let her in the apartment, she

used the bathroom, and the appellant indicated he was going to see
if his sister was back with the car (T. 22).

The prosecutrix

testified that she then passed out (T. 23) and that she doesn't
remember anything until she saw appellant standing by the doorway.
She testified that she got up off the couch (T.23) where she had been
asleep and walked over to where he was.
she did.

He began to rub her back.

He asked her to sit down and

The prosecutrix then testified

that appellant rubbed her back, took her shirt off, and rubbed her
back with lotion.

He later took off her blue jeans, her underwear

and her shoes and continued rubbing her body.
made her feel relaxed.

She testified this

During this time the prosecutrix
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made no effort to prevent him from doing so.

After some time

prosecutrix testified that they began to have intercourse (T. 25).
After a while the prosecutrix testified that she attempted
to get up and appellant rolled her over and asked her to perform
oral sex.

She testified that she said she wanted to go home

(T. 26).

She then testified that appellant asked her again to

do it for him and that, although she tried to put up resistence,
she was unable to (T. 26).

She further testified that appellant

started to put a Mikelob beer bottle inside of her but that she
grabbed his arm and told him to stop and then "I told him I'd
do what he wanted me to and so then I tried to do it for him"
(T. 27).

She testified she told him she loved him (T. 28) and

that she performed this act for about an hour (T. 54).

She

also testified that when they were finished, she asked him to
take her out to breakfast again (T. 29).

After a while they

went into the other room and fell asleep.
The prosecutrix testified that when she woke up she was
in bed, she put on her clothes and ran out of the house for three
blocks.

She made contact with an individual and asked to use

the phone and immediately called her mother.

At her father's

suggestion, they decided to call the police (T. 30).
The State presented testimony that Michelle Christiansen
was taken to the hospital where the examining doctor found no
evidence of sexual intercourse.

At the hospital urine and blood

samples were also taken from Michelle Christiansen.

The blood
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 4 -

and urine were tested for the presence of trichloral ethanol,
a metabolite of chloral hydrate.

Trichloral ethanol was found

in the urine and was found in the blood at the level of 6.1
micrograms per millileter.

State's witness Brian Finkle testified

that a level of 6.1 micrograms per millileter of trichloral
ethanol in the blood would have indicated to him that there
"must have had a blood concentration prior to that time very
much higher and, indeed, much higher than anyone in my experience
would achieve had they been prescribed this drug by a physician
for medical purposes" (T. 104).

This fact, however, is only

true when the blood and the testing is kept under controlled
circumstances which was not the case in the this instance.
State's witness Ladislav Kopjak, chemist at the Center
for Human Toxicology, University of Utah, testified (T. 94) that
"because the drug trichloral ethanol is a volatile-type substance,
such as alcohol, and if it's not refrigerated there is a chance
that it could seep out from the vial and the tubes".

Therefore,

"The effect would be that the concentration that I reported
in the blood would most likely have been higher because it was
not refrigerated".
Testimony from State's witnesses Pat Smith and Nurse
McClintick (T. 77,78) indicated that viles had not been refrigerated between the period from the 27th of September, 1977, to
some time after 3:45 p.m. on the 29th of September, 1977.

Those

combined facts showed that the reliability of the tests conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ducted, concerning the level of trichloral ethanol, were not
all together established.

The prosecutrix testified that during

the time of the intercourse and oral sex she felt sleepy, tired
and slightly dizzy.

State's witness Lisa Don Thornwall, who

also consumed a green capsule, testified she suffered no noticable
effects from the capsule (T. 158).
Appellant expressed concern about prosecutrix the next
morning when he telephoned Diana Visick (T. 143) and offered to
help try to find "Shelly" (T. 143).

Appellant was arrested

without resistance and was described as cooperative at all times
(T. 130).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW IS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF FORCIBLE SODOMY.
The standard for review of the sufficiency of the evidence
for a conviction is that "it must appear that upon so viewing
the evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a
reasonable doubt that the defendant cotllIIlitted the crime".

State

v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (1977).
But when the sufficiency of the evidence is being reviewed in a sex-offense conviction,
There must be considered the ease of assertion
of the forcible accomplishment of the sexual
act, with impossibility of defense except by
direct denial, or of the proneness of the woman,
- 6 -
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when she finds the fact of her disgrace discovered or likely of discovery to minimize
her fault by asserting force or violence, which
had led courts to hold to a very strict rule
of proof in such cases.
State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162 364 P 2d 109
at 112 (1961).
'
·
The need for these added considerations in determining
the sufficiency of the evidence in a sex-offense is that the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix will be enough to sustain a conviction, State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197, 381 P.2d 81
(1963).

When the conviction is based upon the uncorroborated

testimony of a single complaining witness the appellate Court
must decide if the "evidence is so inherently improbable as to
be unworthy of belief, that upon objective analysis, reasonable
minds could not believe beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant
was guilty of the offense charged".

State v. Mills, 530 P.2d

1272 (Utah, 1975).
The essential elements of the crime of forcible sodomy
are given in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-403 (1953 as amended).

A

person commits forcible sodomy when he engages in any sexual
act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus
of another person regardless of the sex of either participant,
and when that is committed upon another without the other's consent.

Consent in a sex offense is defined in Utah Code Ann.

§76-5-406 (1953 as amended).

The subsections applicable in

this case include:
- 7 -
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(1) When the actor compels the victim to
submit or participate by force that overcomes
such earnest resistance as might reasonably
be expected under the circumstances; or
(2) The actor compels the victim to submit
or participate by any threat that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary
resolution.
Finally, the State has the burden of proving the lack of consent
as an element of the crime.

State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347

P.2d 865 (1959).
POINT A
THE PROSECUTRIX'S STORY IS INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE
AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE CORROBORATING
HER CLAIM OF A LACK OF CONSENT, THE EVIDENCE IS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AS A MATTER
OF LAW.
In this case the appellant was convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.

But the prosecutrix's

testimony is so inherently improbable that it is unworthy of belief.

Thus, under State v. Mills, supra, this evidence is insuf-

ficient to support a conviction.
The prosecutrix's testimony was replete with inconsistencies and contradictions making her testimony improbable, and consequently unworthy of belief.
The major inconsistencies in the prosecutrix's testimony
are those when she described her own condition on the night of
the incident.

She stated that the reason she would not resist

the appellant, by actions or by words, was that she was dizzy
(T. 24) and that "I was asleep" and "didn't have any control
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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over my muscles" (T. 25,26).

However, she also stated that just

prior to this incident, she was able to walk from appellant's
mother's house to the other apartment, she was able to use the
bathroom by herself, and after she had slept on the couch, she
got off the couch to go to the doorway with him and could walk
at that time.

In the middle of all of the actions by appellant,

the prosecutrix testified she was able to sit up and, that at
one point, she grabbed his arm away (T. 27).

Also, after they

had finished, she walked back into the bedroom by herself.
Further, during this time she testified she was too weak and
too dizzy to scream or yell out.

However, she testified about

a continuous conversation with the appellant (T. 27,28).
Because of these inconsistencies in the crucial aspects
of her testimony concerning her ability to resist appellant's
advances, the prosecutrix's story that the appellant forced her
to engage in sodomy without her consent is inherently improbable.
Thus without further corroboration, the prosecutrix's testimony
of her failure to consent to the sodomy is insufficient as a
matter of law to support a conviction.
The prosecutrix testified as to having two small bruises
on the inside of her legs, which bruises are consistent with
consentual intercourse.

Further, the jury found that appellant

was not guilty of rape, in that the alleged intercourse was not
without prosecutrix's consent.

Those bruises are not inconsistent

with consentual sodomy as well.

There is absolutely no corrobor-
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ation in fact of prosecutrix's testimony that she was choked,
pushed down hard on the floor, or grabbed by the arms.

There

is no physical corrobroation of the fact that any intercourse
took place, nor that any sodomy took place.
Dr. Evans, who examined the prosecutrix the morning of
September 27, 1977, could not testify that the prosecutrix had
even engaged in intercourse.

He found no evidence of trauma to

the genital area, nor to the mouth.

He found no bruises or

lacerations, or any other physical symptoms of forcible sodomy
of intercourse or struggle.
A third fact which prosecutrix testified to, but is uncorroborated by any of the witnesses, is that of the appellant's
anger or violence.

The prosecutrix in this case is the only

person who alleged that the appellant was anything but friendly,
cooperative and concerned.

Even the prosecutrix's own testimony

described him as nice (T. 39) and concerned about her well-being
(T. 23).

Lisa Don Thornwall testified that the appellant was

at all times nice and polite;

Preston Truman did not testify to

any violent acts by appellant; Diana Visick testified that the
appellant expressed concern over the whereabouts of prosecutrix
and agreed to begin to help search for her; Detective Pat Smith
testified that the appellant was always cooperative and helpful
during this investigation.

All of these individuals saw the

appellant just prior or just subsequently to the events to which
the prosecutrix testified.

None of these individuals corroborates

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

her claim that the appellant was very angry or, in fact, violent.
Consequently, reasonably minds would entertain a reasonable doubt
that the appellant committed the crime.

The conviction for

forcible sodomy must be reversed.
POINT B
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE LACK OF CONSENT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF REASONABLY EXPECTED
RESISTANCE TO BE OVERCOME BY FORCE AND THERE WAS
NO EVIDENCE OF IMMEDIATE THREATS WHICH WOULD
PREVENT RESISTANCE BY A PERSON OF ORDINARY
RESOLUTION.
Under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-406 (1953 as amended) a lack
of consent may be demonstrated by showing either force that overcomes a reasonable resistance or threats that would prevent
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution.
In State v. Horne, supra, the resistance that the law
requires a woman make is no "more than her age, strength, the
surrounding facts, and all attending circumstances make it reasonable for her to do in order to manifest her opposition".
p. 111, 112.

Id at

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court found the facts

insufficient as a matter of law to support a convicton.
factors that the Court considered included:

The

(1) during the period

of time that the defendant was in her trailer the prosecutrix
made no outcry; (2) the prosecutrix did not attempt to leave or
seek help during the incident; (3) there was no evidence of marks
or bruises; (4) there was no evidence of threats made either upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the prosecutrix or her children; and (5) the length of time the
prosecutrix waited before making a complaint.
During the approximately three hours of interaction
between appellant and prosecutrix, prosecutrix made no outcry.
Although she testified she was weak, and later that he grabbed
her mouth preventing her from screaming, she had been able to
carry on a conversation with appellant during the same period of
time.

Furthermore, because she had walked in that neighborhood

prior to being inside of the house, she was aware of the fact that
it was a residential neighborhood and that there were houses and
people close by in the surrounding area who could have heard the
outcry.
Secondly, the prosecutrix had ample opportunities to
leave and seek help, but she did not avail herself of such
opportunities.

She was able to walk around the apartment freely

from the time that she got there to the time when she finally
left, as evidence by her own testimony.

Within the apartment,

she was able to walk to the bathroom, she was able to walk around
the living room, and she was able to move under her own power
to the bedroom.

The prosecutrix's claimed that she was restrained

at some point by the appellant.

However, it should be observed

that she performed oral sex upon appellant for one hour without
attempting to get away and even when the whole episode was over,
she made no attempt to run away.
Thirdly, there was little or no evidence of a struggle.
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The prosecutrix testified to two small bruises, which were not
observed by the doctor.

She had no bruises, no abraisions, no

lacerations around the throat or face or the arms where she
testified that she was grabbed and choked.

She had no marks

on her mouth where she said appellant grabbed her.

She had no

bruises on her back, although she claimed that she was thrown
down forcefully on the floor.

Prosecutrix admits she did not

strike, kick or push away the appellant.
at all, in fact, to fight him off.

She made no attempt

Prosecutrix testified

appellant became angry and that made her afraid.
she said "no" to the appellant.

She claimed

At the same time she was saying

"no", however, she was also discussing going out to breakfast,
which she stated that she suggested to appellant several times.
That conversation, combined with the fact that there was no
physical resistance, does not provide sufficient evidence to
establish that the prosecutrix resisted any force asserted by
the appellant, under the circumstances.
Another factor in the Horne case was that there was no
evidence that threats had been made.

Here, the only claim

prosecutrix made of a threat was when she claimed the appellant
told her that she would be sorry if she didn't go along with it.
This case is distinguishable from State v. Cederstrom, Utah
Supreme Court No. 14777 (December, 1977), in that the prosecutrix
in Cederstrom claimed that the defendant displayed a knife, a
- 13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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screw driver, or other similar object when making the threat
that she would be hurt.
was ever found.

Here no weapon was displayed.

No weapon

In fact, the prosecutrix did not testify that

appellant had a weapon or threatened to use a weapon.

Similarly,

this case is distinguishable from State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700
(1977).

In the Studham case, this Court found several facts

which in totality added to the circumstances and sustained the
conviction on the grounds that under those circumstances, the
prosecutrix had resisted force sufficient to meet the standards
in the Horne case.

In that case, the evidence showed that

the prosecutrix had a young son in the apartment and that she had
a bruise or cut on her lip.

The prosecutrix had testified that

defendant had told her that she would not live to be past the
age of twenty-one.

The threats, combined with the concern of

the safety of the young child and the bruises or cut on her lip,
were sufficient to show that the prosecutrix had acted reasonably
under the circumstances.
on several grounds.

This case is distinguishable, however,

First of all, the prosecutrix had no young

son or other person to protect besides herself.

Secondly,

prosecutrix did not testify to any threats made by appellant
to her.

Thirdly, prosecutrix displayed no signs of physical

injury or traumas, such that might be expected if one had resisted
force.

It must be remembered in this case, the prosecutrix is

seventeen years old

and in reasonably good health.

She had

not been forced to go any place that she did not want to go.
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She was aware of the surrounding area in which these events
tood place.

Yet in this case, the prosecutrix put up no re-

sistance, physically, and other than the words, "No, I want to
go home", gave very little indication of lack of consent.

When

she agreed to perform oral sex she continued for one hour.

All

of these factors sustain the implication that if any intercourse
or acts of sodomy occurred, they were only with the consent of
the prosecutrix under these circumstances.
On the basis of these facts, a reasonable mind would
entertain a reasonable doubt that there was a lack of consent
on the part of the prosecutrix, and judgment must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case is insufficient for the
appellant to be convicted of forcible sodomy.

The appellant

made no threat that would have prevented the prosecutrix's resistance.

The prosecutrix's lack of consent was not evidence

by resistance reasonable for her age, strength, the surrounding
facts and attending circumstances.

The prosecutrix did not

resist in any way reasonably expected under the circumstances.
At no time did she make an attempt to leave the residence,
nor did she make an attempt to attract the attention of others.
At no time prior to sexual intercourse by the prosecutrix's
testimony, did she intimate that she did not desire to participate in the act of intercourse.

She suffered no cuts, bruises,
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or abrasions; she suffered no damage to her clothing as a result
of the incident.

Consequently, there is a reasonable doubt that

the appellant engaged in the act of forcible sodomy.
Respectfully submitted,

G. L. FLETCHER
Attorney for Appellant
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